ISSG Moving Ahead in International Leadership

There are generally three kinds of people in the world. There are those that do—and by risking greatly may either succeed or fail. There are those that watch those that do—and may contribute through their comments but who never have the satisfaction of having achieved great goals. And there are those that wish that they did—the tragic that saw opportunities and failed to summon the courage to take the risks necessary to seize opportunity. The same holds true for corporations.

The ISSG Group of Companies is an entity that began with a vision to achieve great things and then strove to achieve that vision. While most are familiar with the maritime security efforts that have protected merchant shipping for over four years, the ISSG Group of Companies actually consists of eight companies with ten offices spread around the world. As we enter our next phase of operations and undertake the next great vision with partners in the Middle East, it is important that people have the opportunity to see beyond the public image and are introduced to the less public entities within the overall network.

ISSG-USA serves to provide a point of contact in our efforts to ensure proper coordination with government and NGO organizations in projects in the area of international support for humanitarian aid and assistance. This corporate liaison company is based in Delaware, USA.

ISSG – Egypt provides a consistent and capable liaison for the purpose of transiting the Suez Canal. It is also positioned and prepared to undertake roles for the future use of the International Airport at Port Said, one of the major staging points for relief efforts across the North of Africa.

ISSG – Philippines focuses on maritime consultancy, including ship management and crewing operations. Based in our Manila office and supported with MOU’s with Progressive Shipping of Manila for crewing, this office supports our vessels involved in humanitarian operations and other merchant vessels.

ISSG – India has been the most public face of the company, largely through our efforts in the realm of vessel protection. It is the main maritime security component of the ISSG Group of Companies and, through our partnership with Jai Malanath Security of India; the ISSG Group of Companies is able to provide highly-capable former MARCOS personnel for the shipping industry at competitive cost.

ISSG – Maldives provides an entity ideally located to support flight and sea operations throughout Asia, the East of Africa and or humanitarian operations that need to bring supplies from East Asia. This center is established to be able to provide both flight and sea operations support.

ISSG-Comoros was originally established in support of maritime security operations and port services. It has been repositioned on the mainland of Africa for the support of flight and sea operations, largely associated with humanitarian aid.

ISSG-Seychelles is currently undergoing its third phase and transformation to an international, operational NGO. Focussing specifically on the logistical and transportation support (by air or sea) across the operational humanitarian community, this entity has been established to provide key support to agencies like the WFP, International Red Cross, International Red Crescent Society, UNICEF and others. By maintaining a clear and concise focus on the movement of critical supplies to operational relief missions, this NGO will establish itself as an effective and efficient means of ensuring that needed at gets to its destination on time and in good condition.

As we enter the third phase of operations, many of these efforts will become more apparent. In the near future, we will be releasing information that will describe how those companies who have already dared greatly to assist the disadvantaged—and those that are daring greatly in setting up to do so—will be able to benefit from these services and the outcomes of a series of projects that will be of unprecedented scale.

As Reported HERE

Marine Insurers Backing Armed Guards as Piracy Threat Grows

 

More ship insurers are backing the use of private armed guards on merchant vessels at sea to combat Somali piracy as attacks and the resulting costs are set to rise in coming weeks, industry officials said on Tuesday.

Pirate attacks on oil tankers and other ships are costing the world economy billions of dollars a year and navies have struggled to combat the menace, especially in the vast Indian Ocean. Seaborne gangs are set to ramp up attacks in the area after the monsoon season ends.

www.issg-seamarshals.com

Maritime Security Personnel Freed in Eritrea

As Reported HERE

British men held in Eritrea freed

Four men who were being held on charges of spying and terrorism have been released after five months in captivity

Four British men held on spying and terrorism charges in the Horn of Africa state of Eritrea have been freed after five months in captivity.
The two ex-Marine guards and two civilian crew members, working for an anti-piracy security firm, were expected to land at Heathrow airport late tonight.
But questions remained over the security contractors' activities in the isolationist country, including official allegations that they set up a "military base" on a remote island and stashed sniper rifles, silencers, pistols and "poison-tipped" bullets "intended for perpetrating acts of terrorism and sabotage".
The men worked for British maritime security company Protection Vessels International, which said they made an unscheduled stop in Eritrea last December owing to rough weather while en route to provide security for ships in an area where piracy is rife. PVI claimed they were arrested because of "confusion over fuel payments".
But Eritrea's government insisted that the men were detained as they tried to leave Eritrean waters without permission, and said its searches then uncovered a weapons cache on the island of Romia. The government alleged that a total of 21 PVI employees were involved in crimes "against Eritrean sovereignty", and that four were caught while trying to escape.
"On 19 December, 21 members of the PVI (including those four detained) infiltrated and deployed different types of weapons, poison-tipped bullets, bulletproof vests, specialised communication equipment and infrared night-vision binoculars in the sovereign Eritrean island of Romia," a government press release said last week.
"There is high possibility that such military hardware is intended for perpetrating acts of terrorism and sabotage. Hence, the members are accountable for infiltrating into the sovereign Eritrean island of Romia and stashing weaponry, for orchestrating acts of espionage and terrorism."
The statement also claimed that 11 seamen stayed in hiding on Romia for four days, along with military hardware, equipment and communication facilities. "These seamen were given directives to keep guard in twos and to pose as 'tourists keen to observe sharks'," it said, proving that the PVI had been using Romia "as its military base and arms depot".
PVI employs former British marines to provide armed on-board security and escort vessels for shipping operating in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It has denied Eritrea's claims.
Paul Gibbins, a company spokesman, said this was the worst event in the company's two-year history and a full investigation would be conducted into what had gone wrong.
"We need to find out what the pinch point was. Was there a confusion over the fuel? Was there an issue over the vessel's departure? We just don't know at this stage," he said. "The whole episode has been a series of unfortunate events."
Gibbins denied that the company was involved "any espionage or acts of assassination". He said that the ship had been forced to stop in Massawa for a crucial fuel resupply and equipment repair.
But, he insisted, the company had worked hard before it docked to ensure that the ship's presence was not regarded "as a threat or hostile action".
"Christopher Collison was dispatched to Massawa to liaise with the local shipping agent and the port authority," he said. "He was there for four days, explaining and negotiating. We had only intermittent contact with him during that time, because mobile phones don't work in that area. We worked very hard to ascertain if it was safe to enter the port."
Gibbins said that, despite the lack of contact, the company was eventually forced to make the decision to give the ship permission to enter the port. However, he said, it had tried to "desensitise" and "detune" the presence of both the ship and its crew by unloading the weapons they carried as part of their regular duties on Romia, an outlying and uninhabitated island, before landing.
"We did everything we could to make it clear our presence was not misconstrued as a hostile act," he said.
The ship spent five days at Massawa, but was eventually forced to leave before it had fully refuelled. "We needed 15 tonnes of fuel but could only get 1,500 litres before we were forced to leave to meet an engagement to provide security for clients," said Gibbins. "In hindsight, it's true we could have done things better but, given the time constraints and the immediacy of the decisions that needed to be made, we worked hard to facilitate safe entry to the port. We do regret those unfortunate events and apologise to everyone concerned."

IAMSP Vetting of Training Process Released

As Reported HERE
IAMSP is proud to announce that it has passed another benchmark in its efforts to provide support for professionalization within the maritime security industry. The Vetting of Training document provides the framework within which the Association can assess training from providers that are seeking the Association's endorsement. This serves two purposes. First, it holds the provider to a high standard in the development of the training and then monitors that training to ensure that it is continuing to meet those requirements. Second, it ensures that the Association's efforts in this respect are both clearly understood and transparent to the submitter, holding the Association accountable for maintaining a clearly communicated, documented, repeatable and audit-able process.

This benchmark is one of the final steps in the Association's adherence to two key standards. The first, ISO 9001:2008 Quality Management Systems(and its associated documents) describes a management system that ensures that the requirements of the client, in this case the submitter and the candidate, are met. The second tier of documents, including ISO 17024:2003 Conformity Assessment - General requirements for bodies operating the certification of persons is intended to ensure that the training being endorsed has been through a process that clearly demonstrates its relevance to the industry.

The Vetting of Training document can be accessed from the Vetting of Training page for those that have registered on the IAMSP website.

Navy chief: Piracy syndicates feeding off ransom payments

As Reported HERE

Piracy syndicates are selling shares in planned attacks, fueled by a surge of ransom payments that help attract investors, the U.S. chief of naval operations said.
Piracy syndicates in villages, mainly in largely ungoverned Somalia, solicit investors who buy shares in the attack missions and gain a corresponding share of ransoms paid by the shipping industry, Adm. Gary Roughead said.
"The ransoms fuel the business, the business invests in more capability, either in a bigger boat, more weapons, better electronic-detection means to determine where the ships are," Roughead said Thursday. "So it's a business."
The average ransom payment has mushroomed over five years — from $150,000 in 2005 to $5.4 million last year — according to the Louisville-based One Earth Future Foundation. The payments are fueling increased raids, adding at least $2.4 billion to transport costs because vessels are being diverted onto longer routes to avoid attacks off east Africa, the nonprofit group said earlier this year.

Read more: Navy chief: Piracy syndicates feeding off ransom payments - The Denver Post http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_17905268#ixzz1KGsmiWgi

Piracy Predictive Model Passes Key Benchmark

PIRACY PREDICTIVE MODEL PASSES KEY BENCHMARK

By Allan McDougall, Evolutionary Security Management, Inc.

We are pleased to announce that the predator-prey model has passed its second benchmark and is now being more fully integrated into our risk assessment processes. This benchmark follows nearly two years of efforts that included the collection of pirate attack data from a wide range of sources, including teams deployed by ISSG Holdings Ltd (a key partner in the effort) and examining that data using two different approaches -- hypothesis testing and exploratory data analysis.

The primary categories and some of the elements involved in the study included the following:

-Environmental conditions (wind, wave, surface pressure and major events)

-The nature of the Pirate Action Group (mothership, skiff, weapons, and boarding tactics)

-The nature of shipping (vessel type, flag, company, past history, and preparedness).

This model combines elements of engineering, navigation and criminology with respect to the above.

While the first benchmark was tied to the collection and analysis of data, the second benchmark was tied to the validation process. This validation process took two forms:

The first involved one group collecting data over three months and testing it for fit.

The second involved taking an independent sample of data to identify correlations and then comparing them to the first set of correlations.

Given the results of this testing, we are moving forward with rolling out the predator-prey model as part of our risk assessment process for our clients and key partners. This is part of our commitment to ensuring that we continue to provide leading edge services.

Those that receive our monthly updates, often through our key partner ISSG Holdings in this exercise, will have received our initial information describing the framework of this model.

www.evolutionarysecurity.com 

MV Eagle Hijacked

As Reported By EU NavFor

MV EAGLE

In the early hours of Monday 17 January, the bulk carrier MV EAGLE was attacked and pirated by a single skiff, with pirates firing small arms and a Rocket Propelled Grenade before boarding the vessel.
 The attack occurred in the Gulf of Aden, 490 nautical miles South of Salalah, Oman. There has been no contact with the ship since the attack.
The MV EAGLE which is Cypriot flagged and Greek owned, has a deadweight of 52,163 tonnes and a crew of 24 Filipinos and was on passage from Aqabar (Jordan) to Paradip (India) when it was attacked. There is no information concerning the condition of the crew.  EUNAVFOR is monitoring the situation.
EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation ATALANTA’s main tasks are to escort merchant vessels carrying humanitarian aid of the World Food Program (WFP) and vessels of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). EU NAVFOR also protects vulnerable vessels in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, deters and disrupts piracy. In addition, EUNAVFOR monitors fishing activity off the coast of Somalia.

Piracy and Ship Security

As companies and people look back over 2010 and take stock of the year, those involved in the piracy issue in the Indian Ocean realize that we are approaching a halfway point in what is turning out to be a pivotal year. This pivot point involves the arming of merchant vessels and how it is perceived. Up to this season (about September 2010), the concept of arming ships was considered to be, at the very least, controversial. As we begin to close out December, however, we see that this approach has gained significant popularity on one hand and, on the other hand, the detractors of it have grown increasingly silent.

On the pirate side of the equation, we have not seen an evolution-- we have seen a shift. The tactics being used by the pirates are essentially the same tactics that have been used for a while now. The weapons that the pirates have been using recently are the same weapons that have been used against the shipping industry for a while now. This is based on a check of the attacks reported to the IMB, EUNAVFOR, ReCAAP, NATO Counter Piracy Operation Ocean Shield, and other reporting centers. The only thing that has changed is that the pirates have decided that they can use captured vessels as mother ships when they are trying to extend their range. In fact, one might even argue that the only significant change is that the pirates are putting more effort into spreading themselves across the whole area so that the military forces are spread thinner. Again, this does not constitute an evolution in tactics or strategy...it is simply an adjustment of their already existing approaches.

On the other side of the equation, we have seen significant change in the industry. Not all these changes have been positive in nature.

The first major change involves the arming of vessels. At this time last year, the debate was in full swing as to whether or not ships should be armed. Amongst the most common arguments were that (1) it would escalate the situation if ships were armed, (2) sailors are not trained for this kind of thing and (3) it’s the navy’s job to handle protecting shipping.  Most of those arguments have been resolved to a situation where private security companies are being asked to be able to provide armed security on board the vessel.

What was notable about this was that it appears, at least on the surface, to be a reversal of who is driving the show. Normally, the IMO provides guidance with flag state administrations coming closely behind. Then the shipping companies and others work in a compliance-focused mindset to ensure that they do not come into conflict with any major requirements. This time, the IMO was reasonably silent, shuffling the issue to the various flag states. While some flag states provided very clear and concise guidance, others have been remarkably silent on the issue. The end result, requests for security have evolved from just having security personnel on board to having armed security personnel on board—to meet corporate or insurer requirements.

At the same time, a crucial vulnerability has been appearing in the way that many organizations are thinking about security. Many require adherence to the Best Management Practices (BMP) as a minimum condition of contract...requiring ships to put in place the measures as part of the overall protective posture. There have been more than a few instances where these measures were not put in place, and the reasons given were the source of the concern.

The problem lies in the fact that there has been a trend to report a single measure as being why a ship defeated a pirate attack. In some cases, it was the speed of the vessel combined with its evasive actions. It has also included the presence of the safe room (misnamed as the citadel approach) and other measures. In and of themselves, these statements may well be supportable. They do not, however, answer why the ship could be reasonably secure. Nor do they address how a ship can be declared secure in the future.

What has failed is a basic understanding of one of the core principles of security—that it functions as a system. Consider this, there is no guarantee that an attack will only follow a certain course of action, there is only a reasonable expectation that it will. Similarly, there is no guarantee that one pirate will behave the same as the next pirate. This is one of the main reasons why different measures have been seen as the core or critical reason why certain ships were not taken.

This is one of the basic reasons why risk assessments are performed. They are intended to identify the scope of threats and vulnerabilities and then prioritize those, taking into account the impacts against our assets and operations. In most cases, the risk assessment will identify a number of different risks. It may even identify a number of different threats beyond those of the apparent topic at hand or the obvious.  When security professionals assist in the design of security controls, they are doing so with an eye to using the most effective and efficient set of measures that address all risks that management finds intolerable.

By reducing the overall security system to a single security measure, the Company is essentially rolling the dice. Let`s move away from the fact that there may be multiple threats (and hence risks) and move back to the single issue of piracy. The gamble that it is making is that the measure that it selects will be the measure that a particular attacking pirate will be defeated by. One might argue that there is a history of success, but trusting past history to cover all potential future outcomes can be dicey at best. This is one of the main reasons why security professionals tend to rely upon a range of measures organized in an approach referred to as a layer of defence approach—where one fails, a backup or following measure takes over to stop the attacker.

This problem is compounded when you look at the use of firearms on board the vessel. Not only do you need to have the various layers of defence present in order to meet sound security practices. You also need them in place in order to prevent circumstances that could lead to significant legal issues.

The main issue in this case involves the escalation of force when applying the use of force continuum. Even as some ships have relied solely upon the safe rooms or the evasive actions of the ship, some companies have relied simply on the presence of armed (lethally) security on board the vessel with few (if any) other measures in place.

This leaves the ship vulnerable on two fronts. First, if the pirate can somehow overwhelm or bypass the security force, then there is little else to stop the attack from being successful. At the same time, the ship is vulnerable on another front. Instead of being able to escalate force, it can only give warnings that lethal force will be applied. This means that the warnings must be credible and, if not heeded, acted upon. In brief, a bolder (or even driven) attacker would only really be stopped when lethal force was applied...something that the ship is supposed to be avoided.

So the vital point will revolve around three factors. We are at a point where the pirates will have to evolve in their tactics or face failure at a regional level as we gradually strip away their capacity. We are vulnerable, however, to some unsound practices that leave single points or minimal points of failure in the overall system. Finally, by relying on a system that escalates quickly to the use of lethal force, we run the risks of unnecessary legal and ethical risks. To respond to this, we need to ensure that the various protective works are aligned correctly so that attacks are too complex to succeed, applied in a cost effective manner so as to provide some return on the investment and then applied appropriately so that we do not simply exchange one risk for another...only when that happens can we argue that there is a reasonable degree of security for the vessel and company.

www.evolutionarysecurity.com 

www.issg-seamarshals.com 

MV Panama Hijacked

As Reported HERE
On the afternoon of 10 December, the MV PANAMA was pirated by 2 armed skiffs with a total of 5 pirates on board.  A Rocket Propelled Grenade was used during the attack which occurred approximately 80 nautical miles east of the Tanzanian/Mozambique border.
 This extreme Southerly attack in the Somali Basin is a further example of the constantly expanding area of pirate activity.
The MV PANAMA is a Liberian flagged container ship, operated by a US based company, with a crew of 23 (all from Myanmar).  She was en route from Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) to Beira (Mozambique) when the attack occurred. There is no news of the condition of the crew and EUNAVFOR are monitoring the situation.
EU NAVFOR Somalia – Operation ATALANTA’s main tasks are to escort merchant vessels carrying humanitarian aid of the World Food Program (WFP) and vessels of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). EU NAVFOR also protects vulnerable vessels in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, deters and disrupts piracy. In addition, EU NAVFOR monitors fishing activity off the coast of Somalia.

Chinese Ship Hijacked

As Reported HERE

China says pirates hijack cargo ship with 29 aboard in the Arabian Sea

By The Associated Press (CP) – 9 minutes ago

BEIJING, China — Pirates hijacked a cargo ship with 29 Chinese sailors aboard in the Arabian Sea and told the shipping company they were taking it toward Somalia, Chinese officials and state media said Saturday.
The attack came just two days after another 17 Chinese sailors returned home after being held by Somali pirates for four months. It also highlights the spread of piracy to areas outside the Gulf of Aden, a hijacking hot spot now patrolled by international forces.
An official with the China Marine Rescue Center, surnamed Yang, said the Panama-flagged ship Yuan Xiang was attacked Friday night. The Ningbo Hongyuan Ship Management Company reported the pirate attack to the rescue centre just before midnight and said the pirates were taking the ship toward Somalia, the state-run Xinhua News Agency reported.
A man answering the phone Saturday at the company said they were still trying to contact the ship.
Xinhua said the attack occurred in an area outside the region where China's navy is part of a multination force working together to patrol the Gulf of Aden — one of the world's busiest shipping lanes — and other waters off Somalia where pirates operate.
Raids by Somali pirates accounted for more than half of the 406 sea attacks last year — the highest total in six years.
The jump came despite the deployment at the end of 2008 of the first international force specifically to counter Somali pirates, the European Union Naval Force.
While worldwide pirate attacks fell 18 per cent in the first half of 2010 from a year ago, the International Maritime Bureau's piracy reporting centre in July said pirates were shifting their attacks outside the Gulf of Aden zone now patrolled by the multination force.
It said attacks in the Somali basin — the country's coastal waters, excluding the Gulf of Aden — and the wider Indian Ocean rose to 51 in the first half of this year from 44 a year ago. At the same time, attacks in the Gulf of Aden dropped to 33 from 86 a year ago.
On Wednesday, another 17 Chinese sailors returned home after being held more than four months by Somali pirates, who newspaper reports said gave the sailors only one meal of boiled potatoes per day.
The Beijing Daily said the pirates were paid an undisclosed amount of money in ransom after the Shanghai-based ship's owner mortgaged his home and all his shipping company shares to raise funds.

Asphalt Carrier Hijacked Off of Tanzania

As Reported HERE



Wednesday, September 29th, 2010
Early Wednesday, a Panama-flagged chemical tanker was hijacked off the Tanzanian coast.

The MT ASPHALT VENTURE was sailing from the Kenyan port of Mombasa to Durban in South Africa when it was boarded by pirates around 4 a.m. local time. The vessel is now headed towards Harardhere, a well known pirate base in Somalia.

The ship, with an Indian crew of 15, is managed by Mumbai-based Omci Ship Management Pvt and owned by Bitumen Invest AS of United Arab Emirates.

There have been a number of unsuccessful attacks in this area over the last few days in this areabut now a hijacking

15 Fishermen Killed by Pirates Since March, 2010

As Reported Here
15 fishermen have been killed by pirates since March, 2010

ZAMBOANGA CITY, Philippines—Zamboanga del Sur fishermen are urging the authorities to solve the problem of pirate attacks in Illana Bay.
The fishermen are also asking the Fishery Law Enforcement Team of the Illana Bay Alliance in Western Mindanao to reactivate a Navy sub-station in Pagadian City.
Ramon Abella, a representative of the fishermen, told reporters Thursday the pirate attacks had increased to an alarming rate lately and that the fishermen had formally asked the authorities, particularly the Fishery law Enforcement Team, to take action.
Abella said since March, 15 fishermen had died from pirate attacks on Illana Bay, particularly in the areas near Dinas town.
Illana is a major fishing area off Pagadian City and the towns of Tukuran, Tabina, Labangan, Dumalinao, San Pablo, Dinas and Diamataling.
The Philippine Coast Guard has confirmed the fatality figure.
Lt. Cmdr. Arman Balilo, PCG spokesperson, said eight of the victims since March were killed in the high seas off Pitogo, near Pagadian City.
Balilo said that aside from killing fishermen and taking away their valuables, pirates also occasionally stage kidnap-for-ransom activities.
Abella said some armed groups also extort money from fishermen.
He said the demand could range from P250 to P1,500 per month.
“Should this problem persist, we have only three options left: refuse to pay and stop fishing, pay the protection money and live through it, or for the government to solve the problem,” Abella said.
Zamboanga del Sur police director Senior Supt. Elmer Escosia said there was an urgent need to reactivate the Bantay Dagat in the affected towns.
Escosia agreed that the re-establishment of the Navy sub-station in Pagadian was also important in the campaign against piracy.
In 2008, a Naval Task Group was established in Pagadian.
During its first week of operation alongside Maritime police operatives, the NTG netted 21 suspected pirates.
The NTG was later dissolved for still unknown reasons.

Tanker Hijacked in Red Sea

As reported HERE



NAIROBI, Kenya — The EU's anti-piracy task force says Somali pirates have hijacked a chemical tanker carrying lubricating oil in the Red Sea.
The force says pirates attacked the Marshall Islands-flagged MT Motivator on Sunday in the northern Strait of Bab al Mandeb. The seizure was only confirmed early Monday after communication with ship was lost, the force says in a statement.
The EU Naval Force says the 13,065 ton-ship has a crew of 18 Filipinos on board.
The Horn of Africa nation's 19 years of lawlessness have allowed piracy to flourish. The waters surrounding Somalia, including the Gulf of Aden that connects the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, are known to be among the world's most dangerous.

Finally, Credibility to the Maritime Security Industry

As you can find HERE

IAMSP, International Association of Maritime Security Professionals. We finally have a legitimate organization to add credibility to the Maritime Security Industry. With a strong Constitution and Code of Practice, there can be a standardization of performance and conduct.

Hijacking off Cameroon

As Reported by EU NAVFOR


PIRATES from Cameroon have reportedly hijacked a Russian general cargo ship and taken its master and chief mechanic hostages.

North Spirit and its Russian-Ukrainian crew were hijacked yesterday, the Russian Professional Sailors Union told Interfax today. It was transporting 6,261 tonnes of fertilisers and soya.

“The ship was flying the flag of St Vincent & the Grenadines and was managed by the Greek company Balthellas Chartering,” the union said.

About 20 armed men took the 7,148dwt ship to Cameroon’s port of Douala, where the pirates disabled all radio and navigation equipment, and took valuables, computers, money and personal effects.

Captain Boris Tersintsev of Vladivostok and senior mechanic Igor Shumik were taken away to the pirates’ boat at gunpoint, while the rest of the crew was made to lie down on deck, said the union, which added: “The men's whereabouts are still unknown."

Russian authorities have not yet commented on the hijacking. One pirate was killed and 10 were captured when Russian forces stormed the hijacked oil tanker Moscow University a day after it was seized on 5 May.

Passive Resistance:

I was giving a quote for security service as of late and came across a company that said they were going to go with a security company offering passive resistance. I was a bit curious as in the nature of defense, there is no such thing as passive resistance. Then I thought of the MV Biscaglia, and that is the closest thing I could think of. Now passive resistance normally would bring in the Gandhi Effect. By that I mean, If you sit on the deck of the ship with a sign that says "Don't Hijack us" and if the hijack actually took place, you would simply jump off the ship. Now this is a bit extreme (and actually happened, without the signs of course) but how can you think of defending a ship with passive resistance?

The only way you can defend a vessel against pirates is with an active defense profile. If you can not show that you are ready to defend the vessel, then you are a prime target. Showing an active, viable defense is the best deterrence against attack int he rist place, Then you must have the means to actually defend the vessel.

Firearms Debate Rages On

The debate whether to arm merchant vessels rages on. There are advantages and disadvantages to having firearms. Certainly anyone possessing a firearms should be well trained, not only in the use of the firearm itself, but in appropriate Rules of Engagement. When speaking of rules of engagement, I am not referring to just reading the rules of engagement, I am speaking of understanding them, and the liability that goes along with the firearm. I am not against firearms but care needs to be exercised here due to the inherent risks involved. Some say that the use of firearms would escalate the violence of an attack. This could be very true if the methodology of it's use was incorrect. Firearms are always to be a last resort. You can follow the legalities of the rules of engagement and definitely escalate the fight, or you can have a proper methodology with the use of firearms and not escalate the fight. Keep in mind this is my own opinion, and I certainly welcome other opinions. I will give a small scenario and explain my view. A merchant vessel is very large, averaging about 200 meters in length, while a pirate skiff is very small comparatively, about 10 meters in length. On the ocean it is a much different picture than land warfare would paint. The merchant vessel has no cover or concealment and is usually limited in it's maneuverability. The pirate skiff of course is in the same situation regarding cover and concealment, but is highly maneuverable. Now imagine looking at a merchant vessel that is 200 meters away from you, and how large it appears, and imagine a 10 meter skiff 200 meters away, and how small it looks. The pirate obviously has a much larger target to shoot at, and his accuracy does not need to be near as good to hit the target. The pirates have displayed a consistent method of firing a few rounds with the AK-47 and maybe a round from the RPG-7. this has stayed consistent as it is a means of intimidation to get the vessel to stop. However, with the normal resistance a ship can offer, speed, maneuverability and standard anti piracy methods such as fire fighting equipment used to repel or hinder the boarder, the violence usually does not tend to escalate beyond the intimidation. Now imagine the 200 meter distance between the two vessels, and now the first few rounds fired from the skiff (along with an RPG round), and imagine someone on the vessel firing back. This may be justified by the rules of engagement, but now you are at a severe disadvantage, as the pirate can start firing much more than he would have. With the maneuverability of the skiff, you are not likely to hit the skiff, however, they have a much better chance of hitting your vessel. This is the type of conduct with a firearm that could place the vessel and it's crew in much greater danger, but is the common practice with firearms. On land, with cover and concealment, this use of the firearm would be acceptable and reasonable, but at sea, it just does not work. Most that want the firearm on boar, are of the mentality that if I shoot back, the pirate will just run away. What if he doesn't? My whole point is that proper preparations of the vessel and crew, with the correct defensive posture and layers of defense, firearms just are not necessary. No one is out there to kill pirates, they are supposed to be out there preventing the vessel from being boarded.