As Reported HERE
IAMSP is pleased to announce the results of the Technical Evaluation Team’s (TET) review of the OCEANUSLive.org service currently in beta testing and expected to move into full production mode in the near future. This review, undertaken by a team of three persons under the oversight of the President, examined the offering based upon its adherence to the latest and sound principles associated with maritime domain awareness, information and intelligence production, and its utility to the maritime security effort currently underway in the Indian Ocean (and applicable elsewhere).
This review touched on 168 topics that included reviewing the concept, design, fragility, safety, maintenance, life cycle management, risk management and training elements associated with the service being offered and took place over a six week period.
As a result of this effort, it is the assessment of the TET that the service does address a significant need or vulnerability currently evident within the maritime security awareness domain, has demonstrated that (under normal operating conditions) to be consistently reliable and to be reasonable in terms of integration and maintenance within organization’s normal operating routines.
The IAMSP is of the belief, based on sound doctrine and experience, that timely information communication and sharing is an essential element in helping protect our seafarers during higher-risk transits. We further echo the concept that such information sharing must be done across the full community of those seeking to protect our seafarers and add our voice to calls to the various reporting centers and organizations to focus on this important goal.
Showing posts with label security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label security. Show all posts
Sunday, May 22, 2011
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
Pirates Breach Safe Room
As Reported HERE
As you can see in this article, the crew had fled to the safe room, and the pirates were able to breach the safe room and take control,
Though the safe room is a valuable tool in anti-piracy, it surely can not be relied upon as the sole protection for the crew.
Pirates off the coast of Somalia captured a German multipurpose vessel with 12 men on board.
The Beluga Nomination, belonging to Bremen-based Beluga Shipping, was traveling from Malta to the port of Masan in South Korea when it was seized Jan. 22 some 800 nautical miles north of the Seychelles, Beluga Shipping said today. The crew of the ship comes from Poland, Ukraine, Russia and the Philippines, the company said.
The Beluga Nomination, built in 2006, is a 9,821 deadweight-ton, multipurpose heavy-lift project-cargo vessel.
Pirates hijacked a record 53 ships and 1,181 crew members in 2010, most of them off Somalia, according to the London-based International Maritime Bureau.
While distress calls were made by the crew to the European anti-pirate mission Atalanta, no warships were in the area at the time, Beluga said.
The ship "is in severe distress and danger," said Beluga, which transports heavy-lift project cargo for the offshore oil and gas industry and to sea-based wind-energy projects.
The crew was able to flee to a security room within the ship when the pirates attacked. Their captors eventually managed to break into the room and take control of the ship, which is now sailing toward Somalia, Beluga said.
As you can see in this article, the crew had fled to the safe room, and the pirates were able to breach the safe room and take control,
Though the safe room is a valuable tool in anti-piracy, it surely can not be relied upon as the sole protection for the crew.
Pirates Seize Beluga Project-Cargo Vessel
Ship 'in severe distress and danger,' shipowner says
The Beluga Nomination, belonging to Bremen-based Beluga Shipping, was traveling from Malta to the port of Masan in South Korea when it was seized Jan. 22 some 800 nautical miles north of the Seychelles, Beluga Shipping said today. The crew of the ship comes from Poland, Ukraine, Russia and the Philippines, the company said.
The Beluga Nomination, built in 2006, is a 9,821 deadweight-ton, multipurpose heavy-lift project-cargo vessel.
Pirates hijacked a record 53 ships and 1,181 crew members in 2010, most of them off Somalia, according to the London-based International Maritime Bureau.
While distress calls were made by the crew to the European anti-pirate mission Atalanta, no warships were in the area at the time, Beluga said.
The ship "is in severe distress and danger," said Beluga, which transports heavy-lift project cargo for the offshore oil and gas industry and to sea-based wind-energy projects.
The crew was able to flee to a security room within the ship when the pirates attacked. Their captors eventually managed to break into the room and take control of the ship, which is now sailing toward Somalia, Beluga said.
Sunday, August 23, 2009
Anti-Piracy Vessel Risk assessments
ISSG Holdings, Ltd. and Evolutionary Security Management, Inc. have developed an unparalleled anti-piracy vessel survey program for the maritime industry. This survey is conducted in two parts. First we send a trained security surveyor to your vessel, anywhere in the world to conduct the survey without interrupting the ships schedule. The report of the security survey is then transmitted to Evolutionary Security Management, Inc. in Canada, where an exhaustive assessment is conducted, and report issued back to the company.
Being appropriately prepared for an attack by pirates requires an approach that is based on sound judgment and analysis. The approach put forward in this program is intended to meet that goal while clearly demonstrating the company's alignment with Section 29 of MSC 1333 put forward by the IMO in June 2009 and other elements of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. While the IMO's guidance is indicated as being a preferred practice, it can be construed, given the maritime culture, as a best practice for companies seeking to demonstrate that they are exercising their due diligence. This approach is further supported by security doctrine that has undergone a peer review to ensure its soundness and consistency with security doctrine and practices.
Theory:
The three following cycles play pivotal roles in the defence of the vessel:
1. Protection, detection, response and recovery;
2. Deter, detect, delay, deny and detain or destroy; and
3. Mitigation, preparation, response and recovery.
In the first cycle, the goal is for the vessel to be able to be adequately hardened against reasonably foreseeable threats. Having been hardened, the next goal is for the vessel to be able to detect and respond to threats effectively. Finally, infrastructure should be included that allows for the vessel to recover from a range of known impacts.
In the second cycle, the focus is on the security operations of the vessel. In this case, the hardening of the vessel and other activities ideally deter the attacker. If this is not possible, however, the goal is for the vessel to be able to detect and delay the attacker from boarding the vessel (and progressively more sensitive areas) until help arrives. Finally, the goal is to be able to deny access to personnel , potential hostages, or critical aspects of the ship. Finally, the ship may want to maintain the means of being able to detain or destroy a potential attacker, although this option will rarely be acceptable.
In the third cycle, the goal is to take steps to minimize the potential impacts of an attack as part of the long-term corporate activities. The first cycle plays a significant role in the preparation of the vessel while the second cycle plays a significant role in the response phase. The final recovery phase ensures that the ship, its crew and the assets on board are protected so that normal operations can resume expeditiously.
The Approach:
There are four basic elements required in order to perform a valid survey of a vessel. These four elements are the following:
An understanding of the threat, including its knowledge, skills, abilities and traditional resources; ·
An understanding of the vessel from an engineering perspective; ·
An understanding of the operations of the vessel, particularly its navigation and how it deals with security events;
and · An understanding of the crew and its ability to respond.
Before setting out on the survey, the surveyor must review the threat profile of the potential threat in the area. Particular attention should be paid to the intent, number of craft, number of persons per craft, knowledge, skills, abilities, and resources (particularly weapons and tools) available to the attacker. This can often be provided through the Evolutionary Security website (marineweb). To get access to this web, you will need to contact
amcdougall@evolutionarysecurity.ca
The second element deals with how robust the vessel is or, in other terms, how well it is likely to withstand an attack. This is broken down into two sub-elements. The first element deals with the materials, engineering and design used in the construction of the vessel. This is a question of robustness. The second sub-element, however, looks at whether or not the design offers the attacker the means or opportunity to gradually penetrate onto the vessel, into the superstructure, and then to progressively more protected compartments.
While the second element deals with how well the ship can defend itself (a question of preparation), the third element looks at the elements of response and recovery. Having detected a suspicious vessel or potentially hostile situation, can the vessel outrun, outmaneuver, or otherwise navigate in such a way that it enhances the ship's natural design features? This is the first sub-element. The second sub-element involves whether or not the ship has the necessary preparations, plans, procedures and testing completed to validate whether or not the infrastructure on board the vessel is working.
The final element of four involves the training and understanding of the crew. This is not part of the ship survey and fits more closely into an inspection under regulatory regimes, etc. We want, however, to remind the ship owner and operator that technology is only one piece of the challenge, the other is a capable and confident crew. Incident reports have borne out the conclusion that those that have solid plans and look like they know how to execute them have a reduced chance of being attacked over those that appear unprepared.
We believe that the Vessel Survey for Anti-Piracy Risk Assessment is vital in the maritime industry today. This program not only enhances the capability of the ship and crew to be prepared, but is one of the most cost effective ways for shipping companies to exercise due diligence and a sound security practice.
Being appropriately prepared for an attack by pirates requires an approach that is based on sound judgment and analysis. The approach put forward in this program is intended to meet that goal while clearly demonstrating the company's alignment with Section 29 of MSC 1333 put forward by the IMO in June 2009 and other elements of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. While the IMO's guidance is indicated as being a preferred practice, it can be construed, given the maritime culture, as a best practice for companies seeking to demonstrate that they are exercising their due diligence. This approach is further supported by security doctrine that has undergone a peer review to ensure its soundness and consistency with security doctrine and practices.
Theory:
The three following cycles play pivotal roles in the defence of the vessel:
1. Protection, detection, response and recovery;
2. Deter, detect, delay, deny and detain or destroy; and
3. Mitigation, preparation, response and recovery.
In the first cycle, the goal is for the vessel to be able to be adequately hardened against reasonably foreseeable threats. Having been hardened, the next goal is for the vessel to be able to detect and respond to threats effectively. Finally, infrastructure should be included that allows for the vessel to recover from a range of known impacts.
In the second cycle, the focus is on the security operations of the vessel. In this case, the hardening of the vessel and other activities ideally deter the attacker. If this is not possible, however, the goal is for the vessel to be able to detect and delay the attacker from boarding the vessel (and progressively more sensitive areas) until help arrives. Finally, the goal is to be able to deny access to personnel , potential hostages, or critical aspects of the ship. Finally, the ship may want to maintain the means of being able to detain or destroy a potential attacker, although this option will rarely be acceptable.
In the third cycle, the goal is to take steps to minimize the potential impacts of an attack as part of the long-term corporate activities. The first cycle plays a significant role in the preparation of the vessel while the second cycle plays a significant role in the response phase. The final recovery phase ensures that the ship, its crew and the assets on board are protected so that normal operations can resume expeditiously.
The Approach:
There are four basic elements required in order to perform a valid survey of a vessel. These four elements are the following:
An understanding of the threat, including its knowledge, skills, abilities and traditional resources; ·
An understanding of the vessel from an engineering perspective; ·
An understanding of the operations of the vessel, particularly its navigation and how it deals with security events;
and · An understanding of the crew and its ability to respond.
Before setting out on the survey, the surveyor must review the threat profile of the potential threat in the area. Particular attention should be paid to the intent, number of craft, number of persons per craft, knowledge, skills, abilities, and resources (particularly weapons and tools) available to the attacker. This can often be provided through the Evolutionary Security website (marineweb). To get access to this web, you will need to contact
amcdougall@evolutionarysecurity.ca
The second element deals with how robust the vessel is or, in other terms, how well it is likely to withstand an attack. This is broken down into two sub-elements. The first element deals with the materials, engineering and design used in the construction of the vessel. This is a question of robustness. The second sub-element, however, looks at whether or not the design offers the attacker the means or opportunity to gradually penetrate onto the vessel, into the superstructure, and then to progressively more protected compartments.
While the second element deals with how well the ship can defend itself (a question of preparation), the third element looks at the elements of response and recovery. Having detected a suspicious vessel or potentially hostile situation, can the vessel outrun, outmaneuver, or otherwise navigate in such a way that it enhances the ship's natural design features? This is the first sub-element. The second sub-element involves whether or not the ship has the necessary preparations, plans, procedures and testing completed to validate whether or not the infrastructure on board the vessel is working.
The final element of four involves the training and understanding of the crew. This is not part of the ship survey and fits more closely into an inspection under regulatory regimes, etc. We want, however, to remind the ship owner and operator that technology is only one piece of the challenge, the other is a capable and confident crew. Incident reports have borne out the conclusion that those that have solid plans and look like they know how to execute them have a reduced chance of being attacked over those that appear unprepared.
We believe that the Vessel Survey for Anti-Piracy Risk Assessment is vital in the maritime industry today. This program not only enhances the capability of the ship and crew to be prepared, but is one of the most cost effective ways for shipping companies to exercise due diligence and a sound security practice.
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
UAV'S
In our quest to improve our abilities in the maritime protection industry, we have been conducting a lot of research about the UAV or Unmanned Aeriel Vehicle. There are many different UAV options on the market today, and many of them can fill the need. the question is, how do you choose a UAV?
For our purpose, we must be able to launch and recover the UAV from a vessel. Most UAV's are designed to be launched and recovered in ground operations. However, some of the manufacturers have developed ways to launch from a small boat or from a large merchant vessel by employing a catapult type system. so now that you can launch the UAV, how do you recover it?
Many factors can play in the recovery especially if you plan to recover the unit on a moving ship. When the unit itself costs in excess of $15,000, you certainly do not want to lose the UAV in the water. The best system we could come up with (along with manufacturer consultation) is to use a 'net capture' system.
Additional considerations for choosing the right UAV range from the endurance of the UAV, how long it can stay in the air, the distance that it can travel away from your position and maintain control, speed and elevation capability, real time video, GPS, and auto return capability. Now these are not all the considerations but a good list to begin with.
After a lot of consideration and consultations with various manufacturers, we have come up with a few conclusions that fit our purposes. First, we must be able to deploy the UAV at a minimum range of 10km with a flight time minimum of 55 minutes. Of course there must be GPS and real time video feed. For this type of UAV, we detect a target within the 10km range and can deploy the UAV to quickly identify the target to determine if it is a threat or non threat target.
Secondly, the UAV that has a flight time endurance of up to 8 hours, and a control capability of up to 20 miles. This type of UAV is a bit larger and more of a challenge to transport between transits. However, if your need is a greater distance surveillance application, this type of UAV works great.
What we found to be the most interesting fact, is that no matter which type of UAV (within our acceptable parameters)we liked, long range, short range etc., the cost of the systems were within a few thousand dollars of each other.
For our purpose, we must be able to launch and recover the UAV from a vessel. Most UAV's are designed to be launched and recovered in ground operations. However, some of the manufacturers have developed ways to launch from a small boat or from a large merchant vessel by employing a catapult type system. so now that you can launch the UAV, how do you recover it?
Many factors can play in the recovery especially if you plan to recover the unit on a moving ship. When the unit itself costs in excess of $15,000, you certainly do not want to lose the UAV in the water. The best system we could come up with (along with manufacturer consultation) is to use a 'net capture' system.
Additional considerations for choosing the right UAV range from the endurance of the UAV, how long it can stay in the air, the distance that it can travel away from your position and maintain control, speed and elevation capability, real time video, GPS, and auto return capability. Now these are not all the considerations but a good list to begin with.
After a lot of consideration and consultations with various manufacturers, we have come up with a few conclusions that fit our purposes. First, we must be able to deploy the UAV at a minimum range of 10km with a flight time minimum of 55 minutes. Of course there must be GPS and real time video feed. For this type of UAV, we detect a target within the 10km range and can deploy the UAV to quickly identify the target to determine if it is a threat or non threat target.
Secondly, the UAV that has a flight time endurance of up to 8 hours, and a control capability of up to 20 miles. This type of UAV is a bit larger and more of a challenge to transport between transits. However, if your need is a greater distance surveillance application, this type of UAV works great.
What we found to be the most interesting fact, is that no matter which type of UAV (within our acceptable parameters)we liked, long range, short range etc., the cost of the systems were within a few thousand dollars of each other.
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